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"If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First
Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit
the expression of an idea simply because society finds
the idea itself offensive or disagreeable."1
When the late Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.
wrote that passage in 1989, admonishing the
Texas state legislature to avoid passing a flag-dese-
cration law simply because citizens there objected
to burning the national symbol as a form of pro-
test, he reminded the nation that the Constitution
was not created to reflect the current conscious-
ness of the majority. Indeed, the powerful nature
of the First Amendment 2 lies in safeguarding mi-
nority viewpoints, which at times can be distasteful
to mainstream society but should co-exist to en-
sure a vigorous national discourse. 3
For a time, the internet appeared to provide a
safe haven for both mainstream and radical
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1 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).
2 The First Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion provides in relevant part that "Congress shall make no
law abridging the freedom of speech or of the press." U.S.
CONST. amend. I. The Free Speech and Free Press Clauses
are incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause to apply to state and local governments. U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV; Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666
(1925).
3 See ROBERT D. RICHARDS, FREEDOM'S VOICE: THE PERIL.
OUS PRESENT AND UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT 77 (1998) (observing that "[t]he original intent and
purpose of the First Amendment was to protect minority
viewpoints" that often are unpopular).
thoughts whirling together to form a truly "unin-
hibited, robust, and wide-open" 4 marketplace of
ideas. That notion ended abruptly in February,
1999 when a Portland, Oregon jury ordered over
$100 million dollars in damages against the cre-
ators of an anti-abortion World Wide Web site,5
thus triggering the next major battle over just how
much protection speech in cyberspace 6 deserves.7
FREEDOM OF SPEECH V. FREEDOM
OF CHOICE
Like so many constitutional skirmishes before
it, this one presents some unsavory elements, such
as graphic images of botched abortions and fetal
parts." However, the more pernicious political in-
vective found on the challenged web site-The
4 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270
(1964).
5 See Rene Sanchez, Doctors Win Suit over Antiabortion Web
Site, WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 1999, at Al (describing the jury's
decision against the Nuremberg Files web site).
6 "Cyberspace, originally a term from William Gibson's
science-fiction novel Neuromancer, is the name some people
use for the conceptual space where words, human relation-
ships, data, wealth, and power are manifested by people us-
ing CMC [computer-mediated communication] technology."
HowARD RHEINGOLD, THE VIRTUAL COMMUNITY 5 (1993).
7 The primary free speech battles fought in cyberspace
involve protecting children from sexually explicit speech. See
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (striking down the Com-
munications Decency Act as violating the First Amendment);
Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. Trustees of Loudoun County Li-
brary, 24 F. Supp.2d 552 (E.D. Va. 1998) (striking down a
government policy involving filtering software to prohibit ac-
cess of library patrons to content-based categories of internet
publications). For instance, in February, 1999, a federal
judge in Philadelphia issued a preliminary injunction barring
enforcement of the Child Online Protection Act, passed by
Congress in 1998 to make it illegal for commercial web site
operators to make material deemed harmful to minors avail-
able to individuals under seventeen years of age. Pamela
Mendels, Setback for a Law Shielding Minors from Smut Web Sites,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1999, at A12.
8 The site includes "a photograph of what seem to be
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Nuremberg Files-includes additional chilling in-
gredients: names, addresses, photographs, and li-
cense plate numbers of those who aid the cause of
abortion and their family members, making it ap-
pear as a virtual hit list for the violently inclined. 9
Doctors who perform abortions are dubbed "baby
butchers."10
For the pro-choice activists who filed the law-
suit,11 the message of the web page was clear. Glo-
ria Feldt, president of the Planned Parenthood
Federation of America, issued a statement shortly
after the verdict declaring, "Whether these threats
are posted on trees or on the internet, their intent
and impact is the same: to threaten the lives of
doctors who courageously serve women seeking to
exercise their right to choose abortion."12 Even
U.S. District Court Judge Robert Jones instructed
the eight jurors to consider the violence against
abortion doctors in recent times and use their
common sense to determine if the site was threat-
ening.1 3
The web page, created by Neal Horsley of Car-
rollton, Georgia1 4 and maintained by anti-abor-
tion advocates including defendants American
Coalition of Life Activists and Advocates for Life
Ministries, 15 solicited site visitors for information
aborted limbs, with cartoon blood dripping from it." DebraJ.
Saunders, Pro-Life Murder Inc., S.F. CHRON., at A7. The site is
illustrated "with dripping blood from a collage of fetuses."
Threatening Speech, SACRAMENTO BEE, Feb. 11, 1999, at B6.
9 See Lawrence Viele, Of Free Speech, Abortions and Dead
Doctors, RECORDER, Feb. 11, 1999, at 1.
10 Jules Crittenden, Jury Clamps Down on Anti-abortion Web
Site, BOSTON HERALD, Feb. 3, 1999, at Al. After the Oregon
jury's decision, the controversial web page was shut down by
MindSpring Enterprises, an Atlanta-based internet service
provider. Patrick McMahon, Anti-abortion Site Kicked Off Web,
USA TODAY, Feb. 8, 1999, at 2A. A MindSpring executive an-
nounced that it was determined that the site "was not consis-
tent with our appropriate use policy." Id. The site, however,
did not disappear for long. It resurfaced within a matter of
weeks on a computer server in the Netherlands. Karen
Kaplan, Technology Shuttered Antiabortion Site Surfaces on Dutch
Server, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1999, at C3.
11 The plaintiffs included Planned Parenthood of the
Columbia/Willamette, Inc., Portland Feminist Women's
Health Center, and five individual physicians who perform
abortions as part of their medical practices. Planned
Parenthood v. American Coalition of Life Activists, 23 F.
Supp.2d 1182, 1184-5 (D. Or. 1998). The plaintiffs con-
tended that the Nuremberg Files web page, along with sev-
eral printed posters and a bumper sticker urging readers to
execute abortionists, constituted true threats and violated the
Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994. Id. at
1186-88. The defendants-fourteen individual anti-abortion
activists, along with the American Coalition for Life Activists
and the Advocates for Life Ministries-won a motion for
about abortion doctors. Varying type fonts and
colors designated whether a particular physician
on the list of over 200 was still alive, wounded or
dead.1 6 The names of attorneys, judges, politi-
cians, and celebrities unsympathetic to the anti-
abortion cause appeared on the site as well.' 7
Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette,
Inc., along with several physicians who perform
abortions, alleged that the disputed web site vio-
lated the 1994 Freedom of Access to Clinics En-
trances Act.18 This federal law prohibits, among
other things, the threat of force that intimidates
or interferes with individuals or groups seeking
access to abortion clinics. 19 The language makes
clear, however, that the Act shall not be construed
"to create new remedies for interference with ac-
tivities protected by the free speech or free exer-
cise clauses of the First Amendment to the Consti-
tution, occurring outside a facility, regardless of
the point of view expressed."20 The messages on
the Nuremberg Files site contained no explicit
threat of, or direct incitement to, violence, raising
the question of whether new remedies were in-
deed construed by the jury in its application of
this law. If no explicit threat was made against
abortion doctors on the web page, the question
summary judgment as to the bumper sticker and several pos-
ters but the dispute over whether the Nuremberg Files web
page violated the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act
was allowed to proceed to trial. Id. at 1195.
12 Sam Howe Verhovek, Creators of Anti-Abortion Web Site
Told to Pay Millions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1999, at A9.
'3 See Carl Rowan, A Deadly Abuse of the First Amendment,
BUFFALO NEWS, Feb. 9, 1999, at B3.
14 See McMahon, supra note 10, at 2A.
15 See Saunders, supra note 8, at 7.
16 The site "crossed off the names of those murdered
and shaded over those who were wounded." Kim Murphy,
Jury Says Web Site Threatens Safety of Abortion Doctors, BUFFALO
NEWS, Feb. 3, 1999, at Al.
17 Saunders, supra note 8, at 7.
18 See 18 U.S.C. § 248. See Planned Parenthood v. Ameri-
can Coalition of Life Activists, 23 F. Supp.2d 1182 (D. Or.
1998) (involving a motion for summary judgment by the de-
fendants in the case that was denied in part and granted in
part).
19 The Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act penal-
izes anyone who:
by force or threat of force or by physical obstruction, in-
tentionally injures, intimidates or interferes with or at-
tempts to injure, intimidate or interfere with any person
because that person is or has been, or in order to intimi-
date such person or any other person or any class of per-
sons from, obtaining or providing reproductive health
services.
18 U.S.C. § 248(a) (1).
20 18 U.S.C. § 248(d)(2).
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becomes why did the jury reach its conclusion and
award such a massive amount of damages?
NEW MEDIUM, NEW FEARS?
The magnitude of the verdict arguably reflects
the jury's discomfort with or perhaps apprehen-
sion of the internet as a communications me-
dium. Perhaps the jury has overvalued the
powerfulness and importance of this new technol-
ogy when it "comes to mobilizing individuals to
commit bad acts.
New media often have powerful effects. For in-
stance, motion pictures were believed to have
powerful effects on children in the 1920s, trigger-
ing the Payne Fund studies. 21 Today, many peo-
ple see the internet as lawless and immoral. 22
Courts, too, have relatively little experience
with internet communications and what they have
is recent. The most celebrated case, Reno v. Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union,23 illustrated a reluctance
on the part of the United States Supreme Court
to construct new models of regulating speech spe-
cifically applicable to this new medium. The U.S.
District Court in Philadelphia that heard the orig-
inal challenge to the Communications Decency
Act 24 suggested that "[a]s the most participatory
form of mass speech yet developed, the internet
deserves the highest protection from governmen-
tal intrusion."25 Instead of differential treatment,
courts have left the impression that the full pano-
ply of First Amendment protections are available
to communications transmitted across the in-
ternet.
However, the Planned Parenthood case reflects a
departure from traditional First Amendment anal-
ysis. The jury clearly viewed the Nuremberg Files
21 See generally SHEARON A. LOwERY & MELVIN DEFLEUR,
MILESTONES IN MASS COMMUNICATION RESEARCH 21-43 (3d ed.
1995) (describing the Payne Fund studies).
22 See Mike Godwin, Cyber Rights: Defending Free
Speech in the Digital Age 32 (1998).
23 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
24 47 U.S.C. § 223(d).
25 ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 883 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
26 See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
27 Id. Holmes wrote:
The question in every case is whether the words used are
used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as
to create a clear and present danger that they will bring
about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to
prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.
Id.
28 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
web site as an implicit invitation to do violence to
the individuals listed.
INCITEMENT TO VIOLENCE AND
TRUE THREATS
Incitement to violence has a long history in
American jurisprudence, dating back to 1919
when the Supreme Court announced what is
known as the clear and present danger test.26 At
that time, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes opined
that speech could not be punished absent a con-
sideration of the circumstances in which it was ut-
tered. In other words, the words standing by
themselves are not problematic unless they are
likely to "bring about the substantive evils that
Congress has a right to prevent."27 The modern
refinement of the clear and present danger test
was articulated in 1969 by the Supreme Court in
Brandenburg v. Ohio.28 In Brandenburg, the Court
solidified what had been developing in a line of
cases throughout much of the century29 and con-
cluded that the government cannot forbid even
the advocacy of force or illegal action "except
where such advocacy is directed to inciting or pro-
ducing imminent lawless action and is likely to in-
cite or produce such action."30
The Court thus made clear that the mandate of
Brandenburg goes beyond mere advocacy, which
was not even present in the Nuremberg Files, to
require immediate incitement to illegal action
that is likely to be carried out.31 No one has sug-
gested that the site encouraged anyone to commit
violent acts against the abortion doctors or others.
To the contrary, the site's alleged purpose is to
profile abortion providers in the event that abor-
tion becomes illegal32 and "does not tell its visitors
29 See Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919);
Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S.
494 (1951); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957);
Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961); and Noto v.
United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961).
30 Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
31 "[M]ere advocacy of the use of force or violence does
not remove speech from the protection of the First Amend-
ment." NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 927
(1982).
32 The abortion issue in this country is far from settled.
The Senate in 1998 fell just three votes short of overriding
President Bill Clinton's veto of a ban on partial-birth abor-
tions. See Chris Black, Abortion Foes Falter in Override Bid, Bos-
TON GLOBE, Sept. 19, 1998, at A4. See also H.R. 1122, 105th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1997).
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that they should kill abortion providers, or harass
them, or even force them out of [the] business. 33
While courts are still groping their way around
new technology law, they appear to have less
trouble applying established law to the new tech-
nology. One example instructive in analyzing
Planned Parenthood involves the use of private e-
mail to convey threats. Federal law prohibiting
threatening communications through interstate
commerce has been around for nearly seventy
years. 34 The law makes it a crime, punishable by
fine and up to five years in prison, to convey "any
communication containing any threat" to kidnap
or injure another person. 35 Because of the impli-
cations for speech, courts that have considered
the law have been forced to wade carefully
through First Amendment doctrine to develop
precise tests for determining what constitutes a
threatening communication.
In United States v. Baker,36 the defendant was
charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 875, the federal
threats statute, after the FBI learned of communi-
cations he posted to an internet newsgroup and
conveyed in private e-mails to another individual.
The messages "graphically described the torture,
rape, and murder of a woman who was given the
name of a classmate" of the defendant at the Uni-
versity of Michigan.37 A superseding indictment
narrowed the charges to only private e-mail com-
munications expressing a "sexual interest in vio-
lence against women and girls"38 rather than
those messages posted on the newsgroup. The
defendant moved to quash the indictment, claim-
ing that his e-mail transmissions were protected
speech under the First Amendment.39 The gov-
ernment responded that the First Amendment
does not protect what it called "true threats."40
The district court recognized that at times
speech can be so entwined with proscribed con-
33 Free Speech or Threat?, P LAN DEALER, Feb. 5, 1999, at 8B.
34 See 18 U.S.C. § 875 (regulating threatening and ex-
torting communications). This law was first enacted in 1932
in the wake of the kidnapping of the aviator Charles
Lindbergh's infant son. See H.R. Rep. No. 602, 72d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1932).
35 18 U.S.C. § 875(c).
36 890 F. Supp. 1375 (E.D. Mich. 1995), affd sub nom.
United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492 (6th Cir. 1997).
37 Id. at 1379.
38 Id.
39 See id. at 1380.
40 Id. Here the government relied on the constitutional
dimensions of "true threats" discussed the United States
Supreme Court in Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969),
duct that it is difficult to separate them.41 How-
ever, punishment for the threat itself would be
constitutionally permissible only if "the threat on
its face and in the circumstances in which it is
made is so unequivocal, unconditional, immedi-
ate and specific as to the person threatened, as to
convey a gravity of purpose and imminent pros-
pect of execution.."42
Moreover, the court stressed that any such anal-
ysis must be considered in light of the foreseeable
recipients. 43 In other words, if a foreseeable re-
ceiver of the message would not interpret it as a
"serious intention to injure or kidnap," then it
does not constitute a threat.44 In dismissing the
charges against the defendant, the court found
that the e-mail communication could not reason-
ably be interpreted as a threat but was, at most,
"only a rather savage and tasteless piece of fic-
tion."45
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the district court's ruling, concluding
the indictment failed as a matter of law for want
of a threat. The court held that to be considered
a threat under Section 875(c), "a communication
must be such that a reasonable person: (1) would
take the statement as a serious expression of an
intention to inflict bodily harm (the mens rea);
and (2) would perceive such expression as being
communicated to effect some change or achieve
some goal through intimidation (actus reus)."46
Planned Parenthood's position is factually dis-
tinguishable from Baker in a manner that places it
in an even weaker constitutional posture. In
Baker, the e-mail was targeted to a specific recipi-
ent. The message suggesting violence toward wo-
men and girls was sufficiently detailed, and it was
received. Despite these facts, the court still found
that the communication did not rise to the level
and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v.
Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1022 (1976).
41 "[A] coercive or extortionate threat is particularly
likely to be a constitutionally prosecutable 'true threat' be-
cause it is particularly likely to be [intimately] bound up with
proscribed activity." Baker, 890 F. Supp. at 1384.
42 Id. at 1382 (quoting United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d
1020, 1027 (2d Cir. 1976)).
43 See id. at 1384.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 1390.
46 United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492, 1495 (6th
Cir. 1997).
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needed to overcome First Amendment protec-
tion.
In contrast, to access the Nuremberg Files on
the World Wide Web, a visitor must know that it
exists, obtain its URL or site address, and then
take affirmative steps to seek it out.47 Once there,
the visitor viewing the dossiers of the abortion
doctors must infer that the site is advocating vio-
lent action (because the message does not openly
encourage any violent behavior). Moreover,
under a Brandenburg analysis, the visitor must be
inclined to immediately carry out the violent
act.48 Clearly, the "true threats" analysis, which
builds on notions of "clear and present danger"
and Brandenburg, must also fail because the
profiles of the abortion doctors cannot be con-
strued as "so unequivocal, unconditional, immedi-
ate and specific as to the person threatened as to
convey a gravity of purpose and imminent pros-
pect of execution." 49 Applying this analysis, the
Nuremberg Files page fails to convey a "true
threat" and thus is protected speech.
CONCLUSION
Throughout history, as new communications
technologies emerge, society experiences both ex-
47 The affirmative-steps scenario involved in seeking out
a web page is similar to individuals who seek out indecent
telephone messages known as dial-a-porn. As the United
States Supreme Court observed about dial-a-porn, "[i]n con-
trast to public displays, unsolicited mailings and other means
of expression which the recipient has no meaningful oppor-
tunity to avoid, the dial-it medium requires the listener to
take affirmative steps to receive the communication." Sable
Communications v. F.C.C., 115, 127-28 (1989). This lan-
guage later was cited with approval by the United States
citement and apprehension. The internet's debut
into everyday life is no exception. The battle cry
for some who fear unchecked growth is to de-
mand new regulation.50 For others, harsh and
tortured application of existing law is a sufficient
mechanism to quell fear as it arises. Nevertheless,
First Amendment protections were purposely
designed to grow and mature with society.
The freedoms embodied in the Constitution
have been tested and provide courts with gui-
dance that appears as fresh today as when first ar-
ticulated. The Nuremberg Files case may indeed
have struck fear in the abortion doctors profiled
in the on-line dossiers. That fear clearly reso-
nated with the Portland jury. Yet, fear alone can-
not justify dissolving First Amendment protec-
tions, especially when speech pertains to issues of
public concern like abortion. What Justice Louis
Brandeis wrote more than seventy years ago is
true today and should guide future courts han-
dling Planned Parenthood and its progeny: "To jus-
tify suppression of free speech there must be rea-
sonable ground to fear that serious evil will result
if free speech is practiced. There must be reason-
able ground to believe that the danger appre-
hended is imminent. 5 1
Supreme Court in striking down the Communications De-
cency Act. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 869-70.
48 See supra note 30 and accompanying text (setting forth
the Brandenburg standard).
49 See supra note 42.
50 This is not surprising given that "[c]ensorship is a so-
cial instinct." RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN
SOCIETY 4 (1992).
51 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927).
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